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Abstract
The increasing use of Artificial Intelligence (AI) for making decisions in public affairs has sparked a lively debate on the ben-
efits and potential harms of self-learning technologies, ranging from the hopes of fully informed and objectively taken decisions 
to fear for the destruction of mankind. To prevent the negative outcomes and to achieve accountable systems, many have argued 
that we need to open up the “black box” of AI decision-making and make it more transparent. Whereas this debate has primar-
ily focused on how transparency can secure high-quality, fair, and reliable decisions, far less attention has been devoted to the 
role of transparency when it comes to how the general public come to perceive AI decision-making as legitimate and worthy 
of acceptance. Since relying on coercion is not only normatively problematic but also costly and highly inefficient, perceived 
legitimacy is fundamental to the democratic system. This paper discusses how transparency in and about AI decision-making 
can affect the public’s perception of the legitimacy of decisions and decision-makers and produce a framework for analyzing 
these questions. We argue that a limited form of transparency that focuses on providing justifications for decisions has the 
potential to provide sufficient ground for perceived legitimacy without producing the harms full transparency would bring.
Keywords Artificial intelligence · Transparency · Public decision-making · Perceived legitimacy · Explainability · 
Framework
1 Introduction
Artificial intelligence (AI) is becoming more prevalent in 
every aspect of our lives. In particular, the increasing use of 
AI technologies and assistants for decision-making in public 
affairs—in taking policy decisions or authoritative decisions 
regarding the rights or burdens of individual citizens—has 
sparked a lively debate on the benefits and potential harms 
of self-learning technologies. This debate ranges from hopes 
of fully informed and objectively made decisions to fears 
for the destruction of mankind (e.g., Pasquale 2015; O’Neil 
2016; Bostrom 2017).1 To prevent negative outcomes and 
create accountable systems that individuals can trust, many 
have argued that we need to open up the “black box” of AI 
decision-making and make it more transparent (e.g., O’Neil 
2016; Wachter et al. 2017; Floridi et al. 2018). This “open-
ing up” will make it easier for us to understand (interpret) 
the functioning of the AI as well as possible to receive expla-
nations for individual decisions (e.g., Zarsky 2016; Lepri 
et al. 2017; Zerilli et al. 2018; Binns 2018; De Laat 2018).2
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1 The European Commission states that due to the increasing com-
plexity of its decisions and the speed at which decisions need to be 
delivered, the extensive use of AI assistants is of the utmost impor-
tance: https ://ec.europ a.eu/futur ium/en/blog/how-far-can-publi c-servi 
ce-tasks -be-deleg ated-ai.
2 This can also be seen in the first regulation on AI in Singapore. 
Here, transparency is a key term used to increase the public’s con-
fidence in decision-making where transparency is a core feature. 
https ://www.mas.gov.sg/~/media /resou rce/news_room/press _relea 
ses/2018/Annex %20A%20Sum mary%20of%20the %20FEA T%20Pri 
ncipl es.pdf. The same can be said for AI auditing agencies, such as 
O’Neil Risk Consulting & Algorithmic Auditing: https ://www.oneil 
risk.com/. There are also numerous initiatives from the industry with 
regard to transparency, for example: https ://www.micro soft.com/
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However, though a lot of interesting work has been 
done in the area of transparency, far less attention has been 
devoted to the role of transparency in terms of how those 
who are ultimately affected (i.e., the general public) come 
to perceive AI decision-making as being legitimate and 
worthy of acceptance. Researchers have noted the impor-
tance of public acceptance with regard to AI implementa-
tion (e.g., Zerilli et al. 2018; Binns et al. 2018) and there are 
several frameworks that can be used to make AI systems 
less biased, more fair, etc., (e.g., Binns 2018; Boscoe 2019; 
Zednik 2019) which might lead to an increase in perceived 
legitimacy. These frameworks etc., however, do not explic-
itly engage with the theories and empirical findings from 
the social sciences regarding how individuals’ legitimacy 
perceptions are affected by different elements, such as the 
transparency of the process, decisions, or reasons behind 
said decisions. As well as this, no general framework exists 
to analyze the perceived legitimacy of AI in the broader 
context of the socio-technological system to elucidate the 
issues of today and tomorrow regarding transparency and 
perceived legitimacy.
This paper discusses how transparency in and with regard 
to AI decision-making can affect public perceptions of the 
legitimacy of AI decisions and decision-makers. The paper 
also provides a framework for transparency and perceived 
legitimacy in AI decision-making in the socio-technical sys-
tem. This discussion is informed by relevant literature from 
the social sciences that is combined in a novel way to further 
the exploration of how perceived legitimacy can be produced 
in general and in the context of AI in particular. Based on 
our reading of the literature, we argue that a limited form 
of transparency that focuses on providing justifications for 
decisions has the potential to provide sufficient grounds for 
perceived legitimacy in AI decision-making. The notion that 
we should opt for transparency with regard to justification is 
not new (Binns 2018). Instead, what is new is the argument 
that perceived legitimacy is produced by presenting the jus-
tifications and contextualization of the mode of transparency 
in question, where actions and interactions are carried out 
by and between the decision-makers and the general public.3
The structure of the paper is as follows. We first explain 
what is meant by transparency in AI decision-making—
with “AI,” we refer to machine learning and deep learning 
algorithms as well as predictive analytics.4 Thereafter, we 
discuss why transparency in AI decision-making can harm 
legitimacy in the eyes of the public. We then explore the 
potential of a justifications-focused approach to transparency 
and follow this with a conclusion and examination of what 
needs to be done in terms of future research.
2  Full transparency in AI and public 
decision‑making
Ensuring transparency in public affairs has been widely 
promoted, both by policy-makers and social scientists, as a 
method of increasing trust and perceived legitimacy among 
the public (see Hood 2006). This has led to a wide range 
of transparency innovations, from making records publicly 
available on the internet to broadcasting plenary meetings. 
Thus, it is not strange to assume, as those involved in the 
debate about AI in public decision-making have done, that 
rendering AI decision-making processes more transparent 
will increase the public’s trust in these processes and the 
decisions they lead up to.
According to common definitions, an organization or 
state of affairs has become transparent (or more transpar-
ent) when an actor (A) has made its workings and/or per-
formances available (or more available) (B) to another 
actor (C). This can be done through various means (M). 
This definition is compatible with renowned definitions on 
transparency in the social sciences (e.g., Hood 2006; Grim-
melikhuijsen 2012 for comparison) as well as those in the 
fields of AI and transparency (e.g., Turilli and Floridi 2009; 
Floridi et al. 2018). When a government (A) can make its 
source code available (B) to the public (C) so that they can 
see that nothing untoward is occurring in relation to their 
use of an algorithm to better predict the risk of recidivism 
in parole hearings, then the government has become more 
transparent in its processes.
Our definition of transparency arguably allows for a 
wide range of combinations of A, B, C, and M. Inspired by 
Mansbridge (2009), we argue that in relation to transpar-
ency in public decision-making, a distinction can be made 
between transparency that (1) informs C (e.g., the public) 
about final decisions or policies; (2) about the process 
resulting in the decisions (transparency in process); and (3) 
about the reasons on which the decision is based (trans-
parency in rational). These forms of transparency should 
be understood as degrees rather than separate elements, as 
it is difficult to provide the reasons for a decision without 
making explicit what the decision is, in the same way that 
3 Although our main focus is the use of AI technology in public poli-
cymaking, authoritative public decision-making in relation to individ-
uals as citizens, and the intermingling of these actors (i.e., the socio-
technical system), the general argument should also apply to cases of 
AI use in more private operations.
4 For a thorough discussion of the definitions of AI, see Russell and 
Norvig 2016.
en-us/resea rch/group /fate/; https ://www.micro soft.com/en-us/resea 
rch/uploa ds/prod/2018/11/Bot_Guide lines _Nov_2018.pdf.
Footnote 2 (continued)
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is difficult to present the process leading up to a decision 
without making the reasons on which it is based explicit. 
Thus, in most cases, the transparency of a process should 
be considered more transparent than the transparency of the 
reason, which, in turn, is more transparent than the transpar-
ency of the decision.
Intuitively, however, not all forms of transparency lead to 
greater perceived legitimacy. Take the classic comic segment 
from the show Little Britain, where a claimant is waiting for 
a decision from an official, and after the official has entered 
all the necessary information into her computer, she waits a 
moment, only to tell the claimant, “Computer says no.”5 The 
reason why this is so comical is mostly due to its absurd-
ity, as it radically clashes with our expectations regarding 
the type of answers we should receive from officials. We 
expect to be treated in a way in which we can rationally 
accept an adverse decision, and for this we need to know the 
bottom-line reasoning behind the decision. In other words, 
we expect some insight into the decision or a certain level of 
transparency. However, if the official at the computer screen, 
instead of merely saying “Computer says no” (i.e., making 
only the decision transparent), turned her screen to show the 
claimant a widely inscrutable algorithm, such as a decision 
forest, and claimed that she has now shown the claimant the 
whole process, the level of absurdity would only be accentu-
ated. Hence, in this context, this form of transparency may 
be a non-starter when it comes to perceived legitimacy. 
This example shows that with AI decision-making and its 
perceived legitimacy, an important question to ask is not 
whether we should have transparency, but rather which kind 
of transparency should be applied.
In spite of the fact that not all forms of transparency may 
have positive effects on perceived legitimacy, some are in 
favor of full transparency (i.e., both transparency in rationale 
and transparency in process) (e.g., Hosanagar and Jair 2018; 
New and Castro 2018). Assuming that the discussion regard-
ing the implementation of AI follows the logic of public 
debate on transparency in general, these voices are likely to 
grow stronger as AI techniques develop and become more 
widely implemented in society. With regard to the Little 
Britain case presented above, the proponents of full trans-
parency could say that even though the claimant does not 
fully understand the algorithm on the screen, it should still 
be made available to them, because being respectful in this 
way (i.e., by hiding nothing) fosters perceived legitimacy.
We believe that if perceived legitimacy is the goal, we 
should opt for transparency in rationale and not transpar-
ency in process. By transparency in rationale, we refer to 
the public receiving information for the justification or 
explanation of a decision as well as details on who can be 
held accountable for said decision. Thus, our meaning of 
transparency in rationale is similar to that of Floridi et al. 
(2018: 699f) and their use of “explicability,” which implies 
that the public receives an explanation or justification for 
the decision made, a description of the process leading up 
to it, and an account of who is responsible for it. However, 
if explicability means that we actually make the decision-
making processes fully transparent, then we do not believe 
it suitable in relation to the production of perceived legiti-
macy; but, if decision-makers should provide an explana-
tion in the form of a narrative where it is explained how the 
decision has been made, then this might be applicable for 
perceived legitimacy.
Of course, the notion that AI assistants should be able 
to provide justifications or explanations for their decisions 
is not novel. In fact, it fits nicely with the core components 
of the rapidly evolving research field of explainable AI 
(XAI) (e.g., Gunning 2017, 2019; Thelisson et al. 2017).6 
In particular, Binns et al. (2018) have examined how differ-
ent kinds of explanations affect the fairness judgments of 
the general public.7 Likewise, corporations such as Google 
and Microsoft, as well as the Defense Advanced Research 
Projects Agency, are currently working toward XAI devel-
opment.8 Our discussion expands this line of reasoning by 
providing a more developed theoretical foundation for why 
explanations are critical and worthy of further exploration.
To appreciate what full transparency in AI and public 
decision-making would amount to, we propose dividing the 
entire decision-making process into three phases: Phase 1 is 
the goal-setting phase (goal-setting), Phase 2 is the coding 
phase (coding), and Phase 3 is the implementation phase 
5 The clip can be viewed at https ://www.youtu be.com/watch ?v=_
lu1xy Yx3Eo .
6 By XAI, we refer to the focus on what is sometimes called “sub-
ject-centric” (“explainability”), not “object-centric” (“interpretabil-
ity”) (e.g., Došilović et al. 2018) regarding what the public should do 
when they are facing a decision. AI should be able to provide rea-
sons for why we should do something or why it did something, not 
an explanation of how the decision came about, assuming that this is 
not part of the narrative explanation. The possible explanations are 
varied, where natural language explanations (McAuley and Lesko-
vec 2013), such as counterfactual explanations (Wachter et al. 2017), 
visualizations of learned representations, or explanations by example 
(Caruana et al. 1999), are just some of the most common examples. 
These justifications or explanations could be given beforehand (ex-
ante) or afterward (ex-post), and they can be generic or specific (e.g., 
Wachter et al. 2017; Miller 2019).
7 They find that the perceptions did not vary between the explana-
tions (Binns et al. 2018). This is not relevant for our case, as we are 
interested in the difference between justifications and outcomes, not 
between explanations (or justifications).
8 In relation to the current literature on explainable AI, however, 
we view the act of justifying a decision as a form of transparency. 
In addition, we argue that there may be a reasonable level of public 
transparency in relation to the design of AI and the decisions made by 
AI. See https ://www.darpa .mil/attac hment s/XAIPr ogram Updat e.pdf.
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(implementation) (see, e.g., de Laat: 529–533 for a com-
parison of AI in the market sphere and Boscoe 2019 for 
a similarly structured process in public decision-making). 
During Phase 1 (the goal-setting phase), decision-makers 
decide on the goals of the AI, how they should be weighed 
against each other when in conflict, and the features and data 
available to draw inferences from. For example, if you want 
your AI to choose which buildings you should give priority 
to when initiating a large renovation project, you may want 
it to have a feature that knows when each building was last 
renovated and which renovation process would be the most 
cost-effective to begin with. Of course, these features might 
pull in different directions, meaning that you will have to 
give the values different weights to guide the AI on what to 
do when said features are in conflict. These decisions are 
often highly political, as they require decision-makers to 
explicitly distinguish between advantages and disadvantages 
at a high level of precision.
In Phase 2 (the coding phase), the AI is developed and 
worked on to ensure it meets the necessary standards. This is 
often a point of introduction for problems related to bugs and 
biases, and is well described in the literature (e.g., Sweeney 
2013; Datta et al. 2015; O’Neil 2016; Boscoe 2019). In this 
phase, it is discussed what the accuracy rates are, what they 
should be, how these and other performance metrics differ, 
how they should be allowed to differ across different subpop-
ulations (when deciding about groups or individuals), what 
data to use when training the algorithm, and how to clean it. 
With public decision-making, the main challenge is ensur-
ing that the AIs are good enough when it comes to these 
issues. Of course, it may be difficult or even impossible for 
decision-makers to know for sure whether the AIs they have 
authorized are up to standard without relying on program-
mers. This is not a problem restricted to AI decision-making, 
since decision-makers rely on expert opinions in virtually 
all policy areas. However, the problem may be accentuated 
in AI decision-making, as few political representatives are 
trained in code reading or programming. Furthermore, it 
may be difficult to establish goals and guarantee that their 
respective importance is sufficiently precise for program-
mers’ needs.
In Phase 3 (the implementation phase), the AI is applied 
in the public decision-making processes, and the results pro-
duced by the AI are used in actual decision-making. This 
can be done by having the AI make the decision by itself or, 
more plausibly, by having an individual formally make the 
decision based on the results or recommendations of the AI. 
Naturally, this phase is often the one to which researchers 
refer when discussing AI and transparency. This phase will 
also, of course, feed back into Phases 1 and 2. For example, 
when AI assistants have been implemented in real-world 
settings, they are sometimes found to be discriminatory in 
an unintentional way and hence in need of modifications. 
Similarly, if left unsupervised, they might develop “bad hab-
its” that alter the intentions of the decision-makers. Further-
more, ideological shifts among the decision-makers might 
require changes in goals and prioritizations, and to further 
complicate things, these changes among the decision-mak-
ers might be sparked by their deeper understanding of what 
the realization of the goals of the AI assistant would imply. 
Thus, there is a constant intermingling between Phases 1–3, 
with all phases deeply connected to each other.9
To make the process of Phase 1 (goal-setting) and 2 (cod-
ing) fully transparent to the public (C), the decision-makers 
(A) need to make the deliberations about goals and prior-
itizations as well as the deliberations of the programmers 
(B) available to the public, along with the training data, the 
testing data etc. In Phase 3, when the AI is implemented in 
the decision-making process, the source code and records 
regarding how the AI is used in the decision-making process 
need to be made publicly available. Ensuring transparency 
of the reasons that decisions are based on means that deci-
sion-makers should provide justifications for their decisions. 
This can be done in each phase (see Fig. 1). Transparency 
regarding the reasons will presumably contain an attempt to 
justify the overall functionality of the AI (e.g., its goals, their 
weights, its methods in different situations) (e.g., Boscoe 
2019).
In the remainder of the paper, we will argue that decision-
makers should in general opt for the more limited form of 
transparency (i.e., transparency regarding the reasons that 
the decision is based on, rather than transparency about the 
decision-making process).
3  Transparency: why more is not necessarily 
better
For AI in public decision-making, voices have been raised in 
favor of full transparency. This would mean making all three 
phases in the decision-making process described in Sect. 2 
fully transparent. However, even though there are those in 
favor of full transparency, the debate regarding transpar-
ency in AI and public decision-making is currently slanted 
toward partial transparency (i.e., transparency in rationale), 
which is seen as a key element of legitimacy and perceived 
legitimacy. Even though we tend to agree with this, there 
are persuasive arguments in favor of full transparency that 
9 For an excellent and more in-depth discussion of how to make 
these three phases more transparent in what we mostly interpret as 
transparency in rationale, see Boscoe (2019). She uses what she calls 
“six checkpoints,” where different actors at different stages should, 
for example, say why they do what they do so that the public can 
access the justification for choosing certain data, cleaning it in a cer-
tain way, etc.
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have not been fully marshaled in the debate thus far. Conse-
quently, in this section, we will present arguments in favor 
of why, for example, releasing the source code could lead to 
higher perceived legitimacy, even though the general public 
will not understand it. We will then evidence why we believe 
these arguments fail.
The first argument for rendering the decision-making 
process in Phases 1–3 fully transparent is that transparency 
makes decision-makers aware of the public eye, thereby 
making them aware of their responsibility to work toward 
the public good rather than in their own self-interests (e.g., 
Elster 1998; Chambers 2004, 2005; Naurin 2007).10 This 
is true for both the decision-makers when establishing the 
goals as well as the programmers “writing the code” (i.e. 
choosing classifiers, test- and training data, etc.). Making 
them aware of the public eye could be through monitoring 
their meetings in real time, or through revealing the source 
code.
Intuitively, transparency in a process can lead to these 
positive effects. However, we believe that this is not the case 
in relation to AI in public decision-making. Beginning with 
Phase 3, assuming that the public needs a chance to actually 
understand the code, the code would likely have to be much 
simpler than it is in today’s systems. This would arguably 
make it easier to game the system, and it would provide 
the industry with fewer incentives to innovate (e.g., Zarsky 
2016; Lepri et al. 2017; De Laat 2018; Carabantes 2019).11 
Thus, in this sense, though, demands on transparency would 
probably produce a lower degree of quality in the decisions 
and thereby less perceived legitimacy.
Similarly, persuasive arguments exist against the view 
that full transparency would yield better decisions in Phases 
1 and 2. One reason for this is that transparency about a 
process imposes incentives on the decision-makers to look 
credible in the eyes of the observers during their delibera-
tions, but this is not necessarily positive in relation to the 
prospect of reaching a good decision. For example, Bok 
(1989, p. 175) argues that all organizations need 
⋯some shelter in order to be able to arrive at choices 
and to carry them out. The processes of reasoning, 
planning, accommodation, and choice are hampered if 
fully exposed from the outset, no matter how great the 
corresponding dangers of secrecy. A tentative process 
of learning, of assimilating information, of considering 
alternatives and weighing consequences, is required in 
order to arrive at a coherent position.
In front of an audience, it may be difficult to change an 
opinion (even with a good argument), present dissenting 
opinions, or ask necessary but seemingly “stupid” questions 
(e.g., Elster 1998; Meade and Stasavage 2006; Mansbridge 
2009). Asking “stupid” questions is especially important in 
relation to AI assistants, since these matters are so complex 
that there will often be many seemingly “stupid” questions to 
ask. Decision-makers and professionals might also become 
more interested in avoiding blame than in finding optimal 
solutions (Hood 2007), meaning that the open discussion 
may become shallow (Chambers 2004, 2005) and fail to pro-
duce the best possible outcomes. This suggests that making 
Phases 1 and 2 available is not necessarily beneficial.
Furthermore, since AI assistants work quickly, thereby 
producing potentially positive and negative outcomes in a 
short timeframe, quick and efficient decision-making may 
be vital when implementing AI assistants (Phases 1 and 2) 
and adjusting them (Phase 3). Thus, the “capacity to act” 
(Warren and Mansbridge 2013), or the ability to actually 
come to a decision and implement it, is even more important 
in AI decision-making than in regular policymaking. When 
the process is made transparent, however, decision-makers 
may be more concerned with signaling loyalty to their con-
stituents or adhering to the special interests they represent 
than with finding a solution to an emerging problem. This 
means that important decisions may be delayed or based on 
Fig. 1  The three phases of AI 
decision-making
10 It has also been argued that we might receive decisions of lower 
quality when deliberations in this phase are made public (De Laat 
2018). We will argue in favor of this notion using a different route.
11 For opposing views on these matters, see Carlini and Wagner 
(2017) and https ://staff .fnwi.uva.nl/m.welli ng/wp-conte nt/uploa ds/
Model -versu s-Data-AI.pdf.
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an inaccurate account of the information at hand, thereby 
resulting in lower perceived legitimacy.
The second argument in favor of full transparency is that 
it should increase public understanding of decisions and 
decision-making processes, thus making the public more 
confident about decision-makers. There are several prob-
lems with this argument, but the most pertinent is what is 
sometimes called the information overload (e.g., Eppler and 
Mengis 2004) or the transparency paradox (Richards and 
King 2013). This holds that if we received all of the informa-
tion from Phases 1 and 2, we would have a lot of information 
to assimilate, and this problem becomes even worse in Phase 
3. Finding the relevant information would be as difficult as 
finding the proverbial needle in a haystack—something that 
decision-makers and the public will understand and adapt to. 
Hence, we will not witness the positive outcomes of mak-
ing the information available. Consequently, there are strong 
arguments in favor of not being fully transparent but instead 
giving the public information about what they want and need 
to know to ensure that they are adequately informed about 
decisions.
The third argument in favor of full transparency is that 
it increases perceived legitimacy because it induces a feel-
ing of control among the public. The idea of a close rela-
tionship between transparency and accountability under-
lies many discussions of transparency (e.g., Gutmann and 
Thompson 1996; Hood 2010; Kosack and Fung 2014). In 
principal–agent terminology (Holmström 1979; Fearon 
1998; Manin et al. 1999), transparency allows the principal 
(i.e., the public) to overcome the information asymmetry 
regarding the agent’s (i.e., the representative’s) workings, 
thereby leading to renewed instructions about what to do or 
even removal from office. The reduced uncertainty is likely 
to render the principal more confident in delegating powers 
to the agent (Ferejohn 1999) and ensuring that it adheres to 
its decisions (i.e., regards it as legitimate).
There are reasons to believe, however, that this is not nec-
essarily true. Transparency as a promoter of accountability 
can contribute to the myth of hidden politics (e.g., Fenster 
2006), where the public does not believe that it actually has 
access to the true decision-making process. Thus, when code 
and data are made transparent, the public might think this 
release is hiding the “real code” in actual use or that there is 
some sort of “back door” in the code to ensure that it works 
in another way from what is expected. Similarly, the source 
code and data that the AI has been trained and tested on are 
often too complex for most individuals to fully understand, 
meaning that full transparency might actually make the pub-
lic less prone to believing that they have more control over 
the AI than they did before they had access to the data.12 As 
such, due to the staggering amount of information available, 
it may be difficult to understand who to hold accountable 
for what.
The final argument in favor of full transparency holds that 
transparency generates positive results regarding perceived 
legitimacy, as the public will perceive the decision-making 
processes to be fair, and this view will also affect their evalu-
ations of the decisions and decision-makers (e.g., Thibaut 
and Walker 1975; Napier and Tyler 2008; Tyler 2010). As 
Gutmann and Thompson (1996, p. 95) note, according to 
almost every normative perspective, transparency is superior 
to non-transparency, and today, transparency has become a 
buzzword in governance. Hence, transparency in itself might 
have an independent positive effect on perceived legitimacy, 
irrespective of the content of the process that is being made 
available to the public. Thus, even if an individual cannot 
understand the functioning of a classifier (e.g., a deep neural 
network) or how the input generates the output, they could 
still appreciate the fact that the government has made the 
process transparent.
However, even though it is intuitive that transparent 
institutions are preferred over non-transparent ones and 
that they yield higher perceived legitimacy, recent empiri-
cal research (e.g., Grimmelikhuijsen 2012; de Fine Licht 
2014) has shown that it is far from evident that increased 
transparency generates trust or acceptance of public poli-
cies. In some cases, the effect can even be negative. The 
problem is that full transparency reveals the actual reality 
of decision-making and that real-world decision-making 
rarely or never lives up to the democratic or professional 
ideal (e.g., Tsoukas 1997). In other words, the public may 
become disappointed when they realize that decision-mak-
ing processes are, more than occasionally, characterized by a 
process of “muddling through” (Lindblom 1959) rather than 
a rational process of identifying the problems, collecting the 
relevant information, and carefully weighing all the alterna-
tives. On the one hand, the recipe for such disappointments 
is certainly to improve the processes. On the other hand, a 
real-world political and private decision-making process that 
the public is completely satisfied with is unlikely due to the 
inherent conflict and inefficiencies in political affairs. In the 
context of Phase 3, the plausibly negative effects of making 
the code and data transparent can be applied here as well.
To conclude, there is much evidence to highlight that full 
transparency in decision-making processes does not neces-
sarily make decision-making about or by AI legitimate in 
the eyes of the public. On the contrary, there are reasons 
12 The effect could be similar for people who are obese and receive 
conventional help from the healthcare system to lose weight. In cases 
where they fail (which is the most common outcome), they feel as 
if they are less in control than they were before they tried to lose 
weight, because they previously thought that they would succeed if 
they only applied themselves (see, e.g., Persson 2014).
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to believe that transparency can actually harm public con-
fidence or acceptance of decisions, not least because of the 
potential problems with fixing low quality algorithms. Of 
course, this is not to say that we should not give access to 
auditors, researchers, or any other actors who can decipher 
algorithms. Giving these groups access may yield higher-
quality decisions and a higher degree of perceived legiti-
macy. Furthermore, there may also be good reason in favor 
of also demanding transparency in decision-making pro-
cesses in the workings of AI when it comes to other agents, 
such as the decision-makers themselves. This is because 
they might use this information to make more well-informed 
decisions, thereby leading to higher-quality decisions that 
result in higher perceived legitimacy among the public. 
However, this does not imply that there are good reason in 
favor of sharing this information with the general public if 
perceived legitimacy is the goal.
4  The benefits of a justifications approach 
to AI transparency
In light of the previous discussion on the potential disad-
vantages of “transparency in process”, we argue that a strat-
egy which focuses on providing justifications for decisions 
(i.e., transparency in rationale) has the potential to generate 
perceived legitimacy among the public, both for decisions 
regarding the design of the AI in Phases 1 and 2, and for 
decisions made by the AI in Phase 3. In addition, we argue 
that a justifications approach can avoid many potential prob-
lems that arise from more demanding forms of transparency 
that bear the risk of backfiring on perceived legitimacy.
Generally speaking, a policy of justifications of decisions 
will inform the public of what the decision is, on which 
grounds it has been made, and in doing so, identify who the 
responsible actor is. In most cases, this information is suf-
ficient for members of the public to form an opinion about 
the desirability of the decision and, if they so like, demand 
that the responsible actor be accountable (given, of course, 
that sufficient mechanisms for accountability are in place).13 
Thus, what we may want the decision-makers to do in Phases 
1 and 2 is provide favorable reasons for the goals and priori-
ties they have established for the AI and ensure that these 
reasons are made available to the public in a way that they 
can understand.
When it comes to Phase 3, the AI assistants should be 
able to provide explanations for their decisions or recom-
mendations in an accessible language. It should also be 
clear who is accountable for the decision or where to turn if 
the individual wants to appeal the decision. Consequently, 
when AI assistants are helping a bank clerk to judge whether 
to grant a loan, the AI assistant could explain a negative 
decision by reporting that to get a loan of magnitude X, 
the customer needs to have collateral Y, because Z percent 
of people in the group below Y have defaulted in the past. 
Since the customer in question only has Y-100, she cannot 
receive the loan (cf. Wachter et al. 2017), and if she does 
not think that the decision is fair, she can argue her case by 
presenting it to the clerk, who then sets her appeal in motion.
There are reasons to believe that a requirement that pro-
vides justifications for decisions and policies in public can 
successfully ensure the legitimacy-enhancing mechanisms 
previously discussed. Roughly put, in Phases 1 and 2, the 
public eye monitors the reasons on which the decisions are 
based. Hence, the decision-makers will have incentives to 
behave better when it comes to producing such reasons, thus 
producing higher-quality decisions. Furthermore, the public 
will receive enough information to evaluate the desirability 
of the decision and, if they so like, demand accountabil-
ity. Similarly, they are likely to get sufficient information 
to understand the different considerations and perspectives 
underlying the decision, thus making them feel included.
Delving deeper into the discussion, the first argument in 
favor of transparency in rationale is that according to princi-
pal–agent terminology, the agent (the people) will know who 
to hold accountable and for what, and this appears true for 
all phases. A policy of justification will tell the public what 
the decision is, on which grounds it has been made, and who 
the responsible actor is. In most cases, this information is 
enough for members of the public to form an opinion about 
the desirability of the decision and, if they so like, demand 
accountability of the responsible actor (given of course that 
sufficient mechanisms for accountability are in place). In 
many cases, a policy of justifications may even fulfill this 
role better than more demanding forms of transparency, 
e.g., when the whole process is made visible. Compared 
to more extensive forms of information provision, public 
justifications have the potential of being relatively short and 
condensed. This means that the public might have a better 
chance of actually finding and contemplating the relevant 
pieces of information than if they are provided with huge 
amounts of detailed information. As a policy, justifications 
might enable the public to adopt a strategy that, in the words 
of McCubbins and Schwartz (1984), is more like fire alarm 
oversight rather than police patrol oversight: they can act 
when something is obviously wrong but do not need to put 
a lot of effort on continuous monitoring. For a general public 
that is not particularly interested in political matters, this 
means that justifications may actually be a more attractive 
policy than full transparency.
Second, the decisions that the decision-makers make will 
probably be of higher quality because of what the decision-
makers need to do and what they can do before facing the 13 For a similar point, see Binns (2018,pp. 548–552).
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public. When the process is complete and the final decision 
made, the decision-makers will need to explain themselves 
to the public. When decision-makers are required to pro-
vide reasons for their decisions, they are, in the words of 
Mill (1962, p. 214), forced “to determine, before he acts, 
what he shall say if called to account for his actions.” Thus, 
decision-makers are likely to properly weigh the pros and 
cons when making decisions (Shapiro 1992), thus leading to 
higher-quality decisions. At the same time, when the actual 
decision-making process remains comparatively secret, deci-
sion-makers can ask important but seemingly “stupid” ques-
tions, change their minds in light of new arguments instead 
of negotiating on fixed preferences, and search for allies. 
These qualities can increase both quality and efficiency in 
decision-making (Mansbridge 2009). That decision-makers 
are given some shelter for discussion is especially important 
in Phases 1 and 2, since these phases are likely to contain 
both technically complex and morally controversial trade-
offs. A cooperative working climate that can spark efficiency 
and problem-solving when it comes to AI in decision-mak-
ing is crucial, as algorithms can potentially cause considera-
ble damage if they are not properly adjusted when necessary.
An obvious objection is that focusing on the provision of 
justifications might increase the likelihood of decision-mak-
ers engaging in a post-decision construction of arguments 
designed to look better than they actually are—a maneu-
ver known as window-dressing (Prat 2006). In other words, 
the justifications that are provided may not be genuine, and 
the only way to determine their sincerity is to access the 
process (Warren and Mansbridge 2013). This implies that 
transparency in rationale could yield worse decisions in term 
of quality, thus potentially decreasing perceived legitimacy. 
This reasoning is based on the concept that decision-makers 
act differently behind the scenes in comparison to how they 
act in public. Transparency is generally associated with the 
“myth of hidden politics” (Fenster 2006, p. 931; see also 
West and Sanders 2003). This myth is a public perception 
that the actual decision-making is something that takes place 
in smoke-filled rooms or private spaces that are hidden from 
the public arena, which is viewed as a scene of drama and 
spectacle. The widespread myth of secret power is sparked 
by the fact that modern popular culture generally tells us 
that we should be suspicious of anyone in a powerful posi-
tion (Brin 1998).
Even though this is persuasive, it may be just a story. For 
example, Naurin (2007) has shown that the popular notion 
that powerful actors behave diametrically differently under 
conditions of transparency and conditions of non-transpar-
ency is not evident. He considers the example of European 
Union lobbyists, who can be expected to have incentives 
to behave in a civilized manner when it comes to political 
matters. Even if they act behind the curtains, they cannot say 
or suggest whatever comes to their minds. They must “get 
dressed for politics” (i.e., present serious and well-reasoned 
arguments for their positions). Taken together, this implies 
that the requirement to present justifications for decisions 
has a good chance of keeping decision-makers aware of their 
position as servants of the public. This will then lead to 
fairer decisions of higher quality, eventually leading to a 
higher degree of perceived legitimacy.
Third, there are reasons to believe that transparency in 
rationale could yield as much or even higher degrees of 
understanding. In Phases 1 and 2, when decision-makers 
are transparent about the decision and the reasons for taking 
it, the public should have greater understanding of why these 
decisions were made, since the information about the deci-
sion will be more condensed, thus making it more accessi-
ble. Opening the “black box” in Phase 3 in the sense that the 
AI gives explanations for its decisions rather than describing 
the whole process will also lead to greater understanding 
for the public. This is again because the public will get the 
information they need in a manageable way, meaning that 
they will not suffer from the information overload discussed 
in Sect. 3.
Finally, the public will likely view transparency in ration-
ale as a fair way of dealing with these issues. To provide rea-
sons for decisions signals that the decision-makers respect 
and care about the affected (e.g., Tyler and Lind 1992) and 
may lead to more favorable interpretations regarding the 
motives and intentions of the decision-makers (e.g., Bies 
and Shapiro 1988; Shapiro et al. 1994; Colquitt 2001; Shaw 
et al. 2003). Thereby, actors receiving justifications might be 
motivated to act as good losers, to accept that they have lost, 
and move on (e.g., Pitkin 1967; Gutmann and Thompson 
1996). At the same time, when keeping the process more 
secret, we can avoid many of the potentially negative effects 
of full transparency previously discussed such as disappoint-
ment regarding the decision-makers’ behavior in decision-
making situations. Of course, exactly what is required for 
a justification to be perceived as sincere and adequate is 
a moot question that needs further examination. However, 
justifications need to be understandable and relevant to the 
decision at hand. These appear to be necessary conditions 
that make the receiver feel included and respected.
5  Conclusions
In this paper, we have produced a framework for analyzing 
transparency in AI decision-making in the socio-technolog-
ical system and have argued that a limited type of trans-
parency in the form of justifications for decisions—both 
regarding the design of AI assistants and the decisions taken 
by them—has the potential to ensure more legitimacy in 
the eyes of the public than transparency in process. When 
realizing perceived legitimacy, we should, as a default, opt 
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for having our AI assistants explain themselves rather than 
open up their code, etc. for public scrutiny. The same is true 
for the decisions of decisions-makers in the process when 
determining the goals and relevant considerations for the 
assistants.
It is evident that our analysis builds on a considerable 
number of assumptions and guesses. Thus, there is a need 
for both theoretical and empirical work that explores the 
role of justifications in decision-making in general, but spe-
cifically in relation to AI assistants. First, there is a need 
for a thorough analysis of what reasons should be norma-
tively acceptable to use when publicly justifying decisions 
in a democratic setting. Second, there is a need for more 
empirical research regarding how justifications should be 
designed and presented to gain public acceptance. As argued 
by McGraw et al. (1995), several conditions must be met 
for an explanation/justification to have the intended effect: 
It must be exposed to the intended audience, the audience 
must pay attention to it, the audience must comprehend it, 
and the audience must accept the explanation/justification as 
legitimate. Third, there is a need to develop an empirically 
grounded theory for how a policy of justifications should be 
designed in practice to satisfy the demands of public insight 
and efficiency with regard to decision-making. Fourth, we 
need to evaluate how decisions and decision justifications 
are perceived by the public, depending on whether they are 
being made by human beings or AIs.
Our attempt with this paper has been to contribute to the 
discussion on transparency in AI decision-making using 
public perceptions that arose from making processes and 
justifications transparent. This discussion points to the 
importance of including a more thorough public perspec-
tive on AI design and decision-making that includes political 
decision-making and policy analysis as well as psychologi-
cal insights into how individuals perceive authorities and 
authoritative decisions. However, more empirical and philo-
sophical research must be done in this area before we have 
concrete knowledge on what to do and why.
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